GOLDEN COUNTRY
The news is relevant. Fascist Italy, in May of '39 he signed the "Pact of Steel" with Nazi Germany, and June 10 of the 40's would have declared war on Western democracies, "set to secure" a large quantity of gold Bank of Italy in the United States. The operation was explained in a letter (March 2, '40) of the then governor of the Bank of Italy Vincenzo Azzolini to the Minister for Trade and Foreign Exchange, Raffaello Riccardi. From early March to 40 days immediately prior to surgery Mussolini, 25 tons of gold - value: $ 27 million and 541 million pounds at the time - were transported on the liner "Rex" beyond the ocean . Part of that money was then used to finance the embassies in Latin America. Two young diplomats, Robert de Bosdari Ducci and Jerome, were responsible for bringing in Rio de Janeiro two bags containing half a million dollars. Complete the factual notes taken from people pointing out that the literature on the economic and political intrigue is kept in the archive Riccardi, entrusted to a museum creato a Genova dal miliardario di Miami Mitchell Wolfson.I fatti sono chiari, lo sono molto meno le deduzioni cui essi si prestano. La più ovvia è che sia stata una manovra finanziaria con cui, in vista d’una futura partecipazione al conflitto, il governo italiano intendeva assicurarsi una cospicua disponibilità di denaro. A conforto di questa tesi, le frasi con cui veniva spiegato che gli Usa «non hanno preso misure per i depositi degli Stati belligeranti, solo per gli Stati occupati». In base a questa considerazione formale una montagna d’oro sarebbe stata imbarcata sul «Rex». Il ragionamento non mi pare del tutto convincente. Poteva Mussolini, cui nessuno nega intelligenza, ignorare che gli Usa, pur formalmente estranei al conflitto, erano di fatto al fianco della Gran Bretagna e della Francia? Poteva ignorare che se si fossero impegnati nell’immane scontro, l’avrebbero fatto contro la Germania? La mossa mussoliniana, se fondata su questo e soltanto su questo, sarebbe una prova clamorosa di dilettantismo. Oltretutto mancavano gli stimoli temperamentali che determinavano i colpi d testa del Duce.Ma la vicenda non è di quelle che sollecitavano i suoi impulsi. È ragioneria, gestita da un personaggio riflessivo e prudente come il governatore Azzolini. Si deve allora leggere la manovra come un gesto di sfiducia nei confronti della Germania? Siamo, con le istruzioni di Azzolini, ai primi di marzo del ’40, e il 18 di quel mese il Duce incontra il Führer al Brennero, dove promise to "march with Germany, however, reserving the choice of when he would. In the state of mind in which he was the Duce could reasonably daring anti-German or a gesture - and is even less likely - to worry about the fate that would have the Italian gold when the Germans, winners or losers or whatever, they wanted to put on your hands? No, the move of the fascist government did not - this is my opinion - a motive or motives that had some bearing on the grand strategies and the major ideologies. Mussolini, still doubtful on the coupling completely up to Hitler - it resolved the doubt, when he learned that
Panzerdivisionen break through to Paris - had no going to give a slap or at least to demonstrate confidence in Germany. Not this tells us - is always, I repeat, my controversial opinion - the correspondence surfaced hours. Tell us, in my opinion, something else. Mussolini underestimated the United States. Giovanni Ansaldo said that if the Duce, provincial talent, he had once seen the telephone directory in New York - twenty times that of Rome - would have passed any desire to tease the Americans. In those days saw the Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Sumner Welles was sent by Roosevelt. Not liked each other. Sumner Welles described Mussolini 'static and solid rather than vigorous. " Mussolini for the Americans, supporters of democracy, counted for little, and non sarebbero entrati in guerra, comunque fossero andate le cose. Dunque gli Usa erano un santuario sicuro per l’oro di Roma. Un’altra profezia che non si può dire fosse proprio azzeccata.
Panzerdivisionen break through to Paris - had no going to give a slap or at least to demonstrate confidence in Germany. Not this tells us - is always, I repeat, my controversial opinion - the correspondence surfaced hours. Tell us, in my opinion, something else. Mussolini underestimated the United States. Giovanni Ansaldo said that if the Duce, provincial talent, he had once seen the telephone directory in New York - twenty times that of Rome - would have passed any desire to tease the Americans. In those days saw the Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Sumner Welles was sent by Roosevelt. Not liked each other. Sumner Welles described Mussolini 'static and solid rather than vigorous. " Mussolini for the Americans, supporters of democracy, counted for little, and non sarebbero entrati in guerra, comunque fossero andate le cose. Dunque gli Usa erano un santuario sicuro per l’oro di Roma. Un’altra profezia che non si può dire fosse proprio azzeccata.
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